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Islam in Switzerland: a few statistics
In a 1980 census, the population of Muslim origin in Switzer-
land had tripled within 10 years, passing from 17,000 to 56,000
persons. In the 1980s, nationals of Muslim origin continue to
flow in at the same rate as in the 1960s: 157,000 people af-
firmed their membership to Islam in the national census, which
means 2.1% of the entire population. By 1996 Switzerland
counted approximately 200,000 Muslims Ð slightly more than
2.5% of the entire population. Amongst them, 40% have per-
manent residency, 15% are refugees or asylum seekers, 45.7%
are of Turkish origin, 36.4% are of Yugoslav origin, and 9.2% are
from Maghreb or Machrek countries. 76% are based in German-
speaking Switzerland, 14% in French-speaking Switzerland.
Turkish nationals are mostly found in German-speaking
Switzerland, while the Arab-speakers are concentrated in
French-speaking Switzerland.
We ster n Euro p e
P AT R I C K  H A E N N I
The relations between Islamic revival and ethnic alle-
giances are all too often presented as being in oppo-
sition. Islamic identity Ð and this dimension is very
present in Islamic discourse Ð is by its very nature
dedicated to transcending the centrifugal tenden-
cies of ethnicity, of nationalism or of any form of seg-
mentarism. In the face of ideological discourse, the
social imaginaries of the interested parties are con-
tradictory. Arab nationals in Switzerland affirm an
engaged Muslim identity by a rejection of national
and cultural ethnicities, while the Turks affirm their
Muslim identity by borrowing the paths of ethnicity.
These divergences from the trajectory of 'Islamiza-
tion' have less to do with cultural differences be-
tween places of origin than with forms of social
change that have diversely affected these two popu-
lations of Muslim origin since their settling on Hel-
vetic territory.
Divergent Trajectories
Islam and Ethnicity
in Switzerland
In the framework of the Turkish immigrants,
the reference to Islam was imposed at two
points in time. Firstly, by the establishment
of a fragmented network of mosques, in-
scribed in both community and religious
strategies followed by small groups that
sought to preserve religious practices of the
migrants' home community. Later on, the
network of Turkish mosques in Switzerland
became politicized along ideological lines,
but ethnicity continued to play a determin-
ing role. In the 1970s, while immigration
was essentially a male phenomenon not in-
tended to become a permanent situation in
Switzerland, religious practice did not mat-
ter much. It was simply placed aside while
the immigrants awaited their return home.
Religious association, not hegemonic in the
least, served as a space for remembering
one's origins (the religious space coexisting
with friendships, sporting associations,
game rooms, and cafs), destined to facili-
tate the return of an immigrant population.
In the 1980s, the Islamic reference progres-
sively acquired greater status as the plans
to return became increasingly illusory. This
was due to, on the one hand, the political
and economic hardship in their country of
origin and, on the other hand, the arrival of
families and the entirely Swiss education of
their children (the second generation). The
mosque, having been a place of remem-
brance of ethnicity and a functional space
for 'preventative asocialization' (Dassetto)
for the first immigrant men awaiting their
return home, became in the 1980s a protec-
tive structure, as much for regrouping fami-
lies as for preserving the identity of the sec-
ond-generation immigrants heavily ex-
posed to the host society. The reproduction
of cultural and social identity of the group
thus became the principal function of the
mosques. The pennants of the football
team in the cafeteria of in the place of
prayer, posters of the regions of origin, and
the systematic presence of a parabolic an-
tenna, all demonstrate the strength of par-
ticularistic identities and allegiances. Turk-
ish Islam from 1970-1980 was an Islam of
the community, far from the universalism
displayed by their Arab co-religionists (to
be dealt with further on). This was to
change at the end of the 1980s. From then
on, the substance which brought them to-
gether was to fall prey to a double dynamic
of politization and fragmentation. With the
population increasing, political and reli-
gious networks lost no time in implanting
themselves in this population fully in the
process of establishment. This continued
until the Turkish community stabilized its
core, having reproduced itself within the
main lines of the ideological spectre of the
political and/or religious field of their coun-
try of origin. In Zurich, the immigrant asso-
ciations were to either join up with partisan
or religious networks, or be directly put in
place by militant immigrants. Zurich was
thus to witness the emergence of 'indepen-
dent associations'. With the creation of Milli
Grush (European wing of the Islamist Party
of the Prosperity of Islamist Obedience) in
1973 in Germany, some associations were
to re-attach to this organization. Soon after,
the Dyanet, State Ministry of Religious Af-
fairs, with its imams and places of worship,
appeared on the Swiss scene. The fragmen-
tation was not to stop at this bi-polarity of
state Islam / Islam of opposition. Contrary to
what was occurring in French-speaking
Switzerland, the fragmentation was then to
continue simultaneously along religious
and political lines. The Nurcu movement
(see p. 7 of this N e w s l e t t e r, Yavuz), known as
an ideological 'think-tank' of Rifah, was to
leave the Milli Grush, for its ideology was
too dogmatic in their eyes. The Suleyman-
cies, a third important network in Turkish
Islam both in Turkey and elsewhere in Eu-
rope, proposing a popular Sufism, was also
to secede, just as the Grey Wolves, an ultra-
nationalist political party which already in
1978, founded its second Swiss political an-
tenna in Zurich. Nurcus, Dyanet, Milli
Grush, and Suleymancies contribute to the
complexity of Turkish Islam in Switzerland,
but all seem to come together on one point:
they make Islam congruent with Turkish
culture, where the Arabs tend to render
Islam autonomous from other aspects of
their heritage and identity.
Arabs Islam in Switzerland
Arab Islamic institutions emerged in
Switzerland from 1960-1970. Two dynamics,
one political, the other social, contributed
to this: in the first place, Islam in French-
speaking Switzerland initially developed in
the wake of conflicts that formed the Arab
political landscape. Sad Ramadan, son of
Hassan Al-Banna, founder of the Muslim
Brothers, created the first Islamic centre in
1961 in Geneva, fleeing from repression in
Egypt. When relations deteriorated be-
tween the Muslim Brothers and the Saudis
in the 1970s, Saudi Arabia founded its own
mosque in Geneva. The polarization be-
tween official and unofficial religious insti-
tutions which, until the present, remain a
central point of conflict of the political sys-
tems in the Arab world, reproduced them-
selves in the crucible of Arab Islam in
Switzerland. The dynamic of Islamization
amongst Arab immigrants did not take the
same path as that of Turkish populations. In
the Arab-speaking community, there exists
a direct constitution of a religious field rela-
tively unified both ideologically and in
terms of identity, and in clear opposition
with the pre-migratory heritage and identi-
ty. Contrary to the situation amongst the
populations of Turkish origin, the Arab na-
tionals experienced a rapid alteration of
their pre-migratory social structures. This
occurred as part of the process of individual
assimilation. By tradition, however, parents
still endeavour to prevent their children
from marrying Swiss partners, although the
notion of free choice, having been assimilat-
ed by that generation, means that the fami-
ly directives are not accepted without con-
testation. Many young people have opted
for individual integration in the host society
either parallel to, or as a substitute for, fam-
ily ties. This can be the result of marking
one's position in relation to parents or sim-
ply because one has come to the host soci-
ety alone for study or for work. However, it
has not necessarily rendered the youth laic.
Some, whether stirred by such occurrences
as the Gulf War, the stigmatization of Islam
by the media, or simply because of repeated
questioning about their origins or their reli-
gion Ð a quest for an existential ethic Ð have
chosen to play the card of the 'reborn Mus-
lim'. For these young people, it is not a ques-
tion of returning to the traditions of their
parents, generally rejected for their old-
fashioned ways, nor is it a way to launch a
community project. Neither the demand for,
nor the offer of, Islam in the Arab-speaking
Islamic groups in Switzerland is fundamen-
tally destined for 'separate development'
(even if certain tendencies of this sort do
exist). All members of the Arab-speaking Is-
lamic network insist upon the necessity of
participation in the Swiss social domain and
upon cooperation with Swiss authorities.
Thus the affirmation of an Islamic network Ð
open to the host society and socially active
Ð is at the root of the decrease in traditional
social control. Islamization, advocating
specificity by dialoguing with the host soci-
ety, and individualization are not conflict-
ing. In this case, they mutually reinforce one
a n o t h e r .
The forms of Islamization amongst the
populations of Muslim origin in Switzerland
are thus diverse Ð this is no surprise Ð but
the interest lies less in plural Islam than in
the syncretisms that the unique situation (of
ethnic heterogeneity under the Islamic ref-
erence, while spatial differences are abol-
ished) risks engendering. Islam in Europe is
confronted with the challenge of internal di-
versity (and not so much with seculariza-
tion), that is to say with intra-religious multi-
culturalism amongst ethnic or national
communities placed in contact by their mi-
gratory experience. After 30 years of main-
taining particularisms, that ideological una-
nimism will manage to impose a vision of
Islam that is both particularist and homoge-
nous is highly unlikely.  u
Turkish mosque
in Lausanne.
